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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
WAYNE C. CLOSE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HAROLD G. BLUMENTHAL and 
VIRGINIA A. BLUMENTHAL, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
~ NO. 9196 
RESPONDENT•s BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not entirely agree with the appellants' 
Statement of Facts. 
According to the terms of the earnest money agreement 
and offer to purchase, the purchase price was to bet paid 
and the land was to be conveyed on June 1, 1959. An agent 
of the respondent called Harold Blumenthal on June 1, 1959, 
after the contract had been sent to the agent's office for 
the transaction to be closed. (R. Tr. 5) He again communi-
cated with Mr. Blumenthal on June 15th. (R. Tr. 5) On 
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June 15th, the· appellants notified the respondent thait they 
would nort perform the contract. (Tr. 3, 4, 5) Theappel-
lants were served with summons on t~e 20th day of June, 
1959, and the complaint was filed on June 24, 1959. (R. 3) 
For the purpose O!f -considering this appeal, it is neces-
saryto refer to the pleadings. Briefly, the complaint alleged 
that the respdondent was the owner of the property. It al-
leged fue existence of Exh~bit "A". It alleged "that on June 
1, 1959, plaintiff was ready, willing and able to deliver to 
the defendant a deed to the premises pursuant to the agree-
ment and offered to do so, but the defendants, then and ever 
since, have refused to ac-cept the same and to pay ·the amount 
o!f purchase money as specified in said agreement." (R. 3) 
The complaint' alleged the respondent was and always had 
been and was still ready, willing and able to perform the 
agreement, and it prayed forr specific performance, together 
with attorney's fees and interest. 
The appellants filed an answer that is as follows: 
"Comes now the defendants in the above entitled 
action and in anS!We~r to plaintiff's complaint on file here-
in admit, deny and alleg~ as follows: 
For a First Defense. 
The defendants deny that the plaintiff's complaint 
on file herein states the facts sufficient to constitute 
a cause of action. 
For a Second Defense. 
The defendants deny each and every allegation con-
tained in plaintiffs complaint." (R. 9) 
On the 29th day of June, 1959, the appellants filed an 
amended answer. Said amended answer reads as follows: 
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"Come now the defendants in the above entitled ac• 
tion, and leave of court having been first had and ob-
tained, filed this, their Amended Answer to {i)laintiff's 
complaint on file herein. 
For a First Defense. 
The defendants deny that plaintiff herein states 
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 
For a Second Defense. 
1. The defendants allege that at the time of the 
execution of the purported earnest money agreement 
that the said Wayne C. Close was not the owner and 
entitled to possession of the said premises, as described 
in plaintiff's complaint. 
2. That the said earnest money receipt, and offer 
to purchase, was approved by Wayne C. Close, plaintiff 
herein, but was not approved by his wife, the said 
Wayne C~ Close being then and there amarried person, 
and that said earnest money receipt, offer to purchase 
and approval, is not a complete contract under the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
3. That the said wife of Wayne C. Close did not 
waive her statutory interest in and to the said prop-
erty." (R. 12). 
On July 30, 1959, a pretrial conference was held. Pur-
suant to the pretrial conference, the court issued a pretrial 
order. In the pretrial order, the court reserved four issues. 
They were: (1) Is the remedy of specific enforcement 
on a contraot for the sale of real property available to a 
vendor? (2) Can a vendor who is a married man main-
tain an action for specific performance upon a contract for 
the sale of real property when the contract does not bear 
the signature of his spouse? (3) If questions 1 and 2 are 
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answered in the affirmative~ what amount is a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be awarded the plaintiff according to the 
terms of Exhibit "A"? And the cOUJ.'It :thereafter reserved 
the additional question as to whether the remedy of spe-
cific performance of Exhibit "A" was availa:ble to the plain-
tiff When the money paid as recited in E~hilbtt "A" had nort 
been returned, to. the vendee. 
No objection was made· by the appellants to the pre-
trial oroer. Trial of the matter was had on November 10, 
195.9. At the commencement of the trial, 1t was stated by 
counsel for the respondent that the issues of law reserved 
at the pretrial hearing had been resolved in favor of the 
respondent. (Tr. 2) With this statement the court agreed. 
It was fwther stated by counsel for the respondent that 
the ovJy issue remaining to be resolved at the trial was the 
amount of :the attorneys' fee to be awarded to the respond-
ent. (R. 2) At pages 2 and 3 of the record, the following 
appears: 
''MR. YOUNG, JR.: The pretrial went further and 
said if these two questions are answered in the affirm-
ative, then the only remaining issue is the issue of what 
amount is a reasonable attorney fee to be awarded to 
the plaintiff. 
THE COURT: Yes, that is correct. 
MR. YOUNG, JR.: So that at this juncture we 
have no problem of title. 
MR. HATCH: No. 
MR. YOUNG, JR.: There isn't any problem of ten-
der of performance on the part of the plaintiff. 
MR. HATCH: I presume the plaintiff and the de-
fendants can stipulate that the defendants informed the 
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plaintiff that they would not perform and did not per-
form. 
MR. YOUNG, JR .. : On or about the 15th day of 
June of this year. 
MR. HJA TCH: Yes, sometime between the first 
and the 15th of June, and that there was no offer of 
return of the purchase money by the vendee and. the 
vendor___,the earnest money-in the sum of $500.00, nor 
any portion thereorf, nor was there an offer of retrnn." 
On the 22nd day of December appellants made a mo-
tion to amend the Findings of Fact. (R. 43) In their mo-
tion the appellants asserted that 11;he court should have found 
that respondent was ready, willing and able to perform the 
contract so far as his own personal interest was concerned. 
(R. 44) 
Appellant erroneously states that the deed which re-
spondent had at the pretrial was introduced in evidence at 
the hearing on the motion to amend the Findings of' Fact. 
The deed·was offered, but the· offer was refused. (Proceed-
ings on- Obje:ction to the Court's Finding of Fact page 5). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
TI-lE REMEDY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IS 
AVAILABLE .TO· A VENDOR ON A CONTRACT FOR 
THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY. 
POINT II 
THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS IN QUESTION EN-
TITLE RESPONDENT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
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THE PLEADINGS JUSTIFY THE FINDING THAT 
THE RESPONDENT WAS READY, WILLING AND 
ABLE TO PERFORM. 
POINT IV 
THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND THE REC-
ORD OF THE TRIAL SUPPORT THE COURT'S FIND-
ING THAT RESPONDENT WAS READY, WILLING 
AND ABLE TO PERFORM. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE REMEDY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IS 
AVAILABLE TO A VENDOR ON A CONTRACT FOR 
THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY. 
This Coort has recently considered two cases, in each 
of which cases an agreement identical to the one sued 
upon was the subject of the action. Respondent refers to 
Andreason v. Hansen, 335 P2d 404, and the case of Robert L. 
McMullin v. Lynwood F. Shimmin and Jacquie Shimmin, 
---'"..-~-Ut. P2rl'-4----
&th of these cases assume, though the direct question 
was not involved, that an action for specific performance 
of a ·contract for the sale of real property will lie in behalf 
of the vendor. This is a statement which was disputed by 
the appellants in the District Court, but which is a well 
known rule of law which has been adopted by the Supreme 
Court Of the State of Utah. Imlay v. Gubler, 298 Pac. 383; 
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Con-
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tracts, Sec. 360; 9 American Jurisprudence, 110, Sec. 94; 
58 Corpus Juris, 917, Sec. 76; 3 American Law of Real Prop-
erty 173, Sec. 11.68. 
POINT II 
THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS IN QUESTION EN-
TITLE RESPONDENT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
The contract provision at issue in this case is well known 
to this Court. It is the same provision ·that was in question 
in the case of Andreason v. Hansen, 335 P2d 404, and in the 
case of Rothert L. McMullin v. Lynwood F. Shimmin and 
Jacquie A. Shimmin, __ Utah , _ __F2dy_ __ 
Neither the AndTeason case nor the McMullin case af-
fords any precedence for this case. The Andreason case· 
was a case in which the action was for damages. The Mc-
Mullin case prayed for damages or specific performance in 
the alternative. Andreason v. Hansen finds support in the 
cases cited by appellants, Cooley v. Call, 61 Ut. 203, 211 
Pac. 977; Rose v. Garn, 56 Ut. 533, 191 Pac. 645, both sup-
port the reasoning of tlle Andreason case. So also do the 
Utah cases of K. P. Mercury Company v. Jacobsen, 30 Ut. 
115, 83 Pac. 724, and Skeen v. Smith, 75 Ut. 464, 286 Pac. 
633. See also 3 American Law of Real Property, 172, Sec. 
11.67, where the following authorities are cited: Armstrong 
v. Irwin, 26 Ariz. 1, 221 Pac. 222, 32 ALR 609 (1923); Scho-
field v. Tompkins, 95 Ill. 199, 35 Am Rep. 160 (1880); Selby 
v. Matson, 137 Iowa 97, 114 N. W. 609, 14 LRA (N. 8.) 1210 
(1908); Beck v. Megli, 153 Kan. 721, 114 Pac. 2d 305, 135 
ALR 1124 (1941); Asia Inv. Co. v. Levin, 118 Wash. 620, 
204 Pac. 808, 32 ALR 578 (1922). See annotations 52 ALR 
1532 (1925), 97 ALR 1494 (1935). 
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It is important to note that all three of the Utah cases 
cited by appellants to support Pffint No. I of appellanrts' brief 
were distinguished by the Utah Supreme Court in Imlay v. 
Gubler, supra, when the action was one for specific perform-
ance. 
The fact that the deposit money was retained by the 
respondent should not predude the respondent from suing 
for specific performance. By the doctrine of the Andreason 
case, a vendor on a contract for the sale of land, which con-
tract has rbeen brooched, has the same rights as the ven-
dor under the Imlay v. Gubler doctrine. By a necessary 
implication of ·1Jhe court's holding in the Andreason case, if 
the seller ohooses to return the earnest money received, the 
seller can then sue for damages. If he does nolt return the 
money, then he ha.S elected under the pro~ion to treat the 
money paid as the earnest money as the extent of his dam-
age. The fact that the seller had an option to treat the 
money paid as damages ought not to affect the seller's right 
to specific performance. 
It is the general rule that a contract provision provid-
ing for liquidated damages at the option of ·the vendor does 
not affect the right of the vendor to bring an action for 
specific performance. Imlay v. Gubler, supra; 55 American 
Jurisprudence, Vendor and Purchaser 905, Sec. 513; 49 
American Jurisprudence, Specific Performance, 61, Sec. 45; 
32 ALR 584; 98 ALR 887. The American Law Report An-
nortation in 98 ALR at page 888 cites Imlay v. Gubler in 
support of this rule. 
It is also true that the retention of the ·deposit is not 
inconsistent with an election to require the vendee to per-
form the contract. Respondent has not been able to find 
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any case in which the vendor was required to refund the 
amount paid as a condition to maint.a.inffig an action for spe-
cific performance. 
POINT III 
THE PLEADINGS JUSTIFY THE FINDING THAT 
THE RESPONDENT WAS READY, WILLING AND 
ABLE TO PERFORM. 
Under the pleadings o!f this case there iS no issue con-
cerning the ability of the respondent to perform or his timely 
offer to do so. 
The answer filed by the appellants denied each and ev-
ery allegation contained in the complaint. (R. 9) The 
answer is set forth on page two of this brief. The answer 
contains a first defense and a second defense. 
On July 30, 19591 the appellants filed an amended ~ 
wer. The amended answer made no ,reference to the answer 
on file. The amended answer purported to he a full and 
complete answer to the complaint. The amended answer· 
contained a first defense and a second defense. There are 
no denials in the amended answer of any allegation -con-
tained in the complaint. 
Since the amended answer contained no denials o:f any 
allegation in the complaint, it admitted that the respondent 
was ready, willing and able ro perform the oontract ·and 
offered to do so.. The complaint so alleges and according. 
to Rule 8 (d} URCP, the allegations in the complaint ar~· 
admitted. 
"It is often stated as a rule that an .amended answer 
supercedes the original answer and that the original is 
no part of the reeord, from which it follows that all mo-
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tions in demurrers relCl!ting thereto accompany it." l Ban-
croft's Code Pleading, page 811, citing Welsh v. Bard-
shar, 137 Cal. 154, 69 Pac. 977; Miles v. Woodwd, 115 Cal. 
308, 46 Pac. 1067; Schneider v. Brown, 85 Cal. 205, 24· Pac. 
715; Pfister v. Wade, 69 Cal. 133, 10 Pac. 369; Everdmg and 
Farrell v. Gebhardt Lumber Company, 86 Ore. 239, 168 Pac. 
304; Wells v. Applegate, 12 Ore. 208, 6 Pac. 770. See also 
Cooley v .. Frank:, 68 Wyo. 436, 235 P2d 446; Schaeffer v. 
Schaeffer, 175 Kan. 629, 266 P2d 282. 
Respondent has been unable to find any Utah cases that 
discuss the subject. The case of Peterson v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 8 Pac. 2d 629, discusses the affect of 
an amended complaint. 
POINT IV 
THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND THE REC-
ORD OF THE TRIAL SUPPORT THE COURT'S FIND-
ING ~AT RESPONDENT WAS READY, WILLING 
AND ABLE TO PERFORM. 
~he pretrial order and the proceedings upon the trial 
support the findings of the court that the respondent was 
ready, willing and able to perform the contract. 
A pretrial order was made by the court following the 
pretrial hearing. The pretrial order states that parties 
agreed that Exhlbit "A" had been executed by the parties, 
and it reserved three issues to be resolved upon the trial. 
They were: (1) Is the remedy of specific performance 
of a contract for the sale of real property payalble· to a ven-
':'dor? (2) Can a vendor who is a married ·man maintain 
·an action for specific· performance upon a contract for the 
·sale of real property when the contract does nort bear the 
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SJignature of his spouse? (3) If .questions 1 :and 2 are ans-
wered in the affirmative, what amount is a reasonable at-
torneys' fee to be awarded the plaintiff according to the 
terms of Exhibit "A"? 
Subsequently, the court reserved the additional question 
of law, "As to whether the remedy of specific performance 
on Exhibit "A" is available to the plaintiff when the money 
paid as recited in Exhibit "A" has not been returned to the 
vendee." 
Upon the trial of the matter, the appellants admitted 
that the respondent had good title. (R. 3) 
In response to the statement by the respondent's coun-
sel that there was no issue as to the tender of performance, 
appellants' counsel said, "I presume the plaintiff and the de-
fendant can stipulate that the defendant informed the plain-
tiff that they would not perlorm, and did not perform." 
"MR. YOUNG, JR.: On or about the fifteenth day 
of June of this year. 
"MR. HATCH: Yes, sometime between the first 
and the 15th of June, and that there was no offer of 
return of the purchase money by the vendee and the 
vendor-the earnest money-in the sum of $500.00, nor 
any portion thereof, nor was there an offer of return." 
(Tr. 3) 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the judgment 
should be affirmed. We submit that respondent had the 
right under the contract to require specific performance. 
We further submit that the record supports the court's find-
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ing that respondent was ready, willing, able, and offered 
to perforn1. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR. 
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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